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The Curious Case of Corporate Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed
System of Judicial Lawmaking
JULAN G. Ku

This article challenges the widely held view that the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) imposes liability on private corporationsfor violations of customary internationallaw. I lay out the modern origins
and development of this cause of action in U.S. federal courts
and argue that doctrine rests on shaky, indeed illusory, analytical and jurisprudentialfoundations. Despite the absence of a
well defined norm of customary internationallaw that imposed
liability upon private corporations,courts, when they even considered the validity of the claims, built a consensus around the
fact that no norm existedforbidding the imposition of liability on
private corporations. This doctrinal approach was particularly
questionable in light of the Supreme Court'sposition that recognition of causes of action under the ATS be limited to situations
involving violations of norms that are specific, universal, and obligatory. Finally, I argue that the rise of this flawed consensus
reveals that our system offederal courts is particularlyill-suited
to the type of independent lawmaking that modern ATS doctrine
has enabled up to this point. These developments indicate that
courts should adopt a restrictive approach to corporate liability
under the A TS goingforward.
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INTRODUCTION

For over two decades, U.S. courts have held that private corporations
owe duties under customary international law and can be subject to lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).' This approach to corporate
1. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 1250, 1258 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.
(Talisman 1), 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Doe v. Unocal Corp., I10 F. Supp. 2d
1294, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 2000); see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd. 504 F.3d 254, 258
(2d Cir. 2008); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 447 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2000); Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir.
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liability was so widely accepted that courts barely acknowledged the issue when deciding on cases involving corporate defendants. Meanwhile,
legal commentators joined in universal support for corporate liability. 2
Despite this wide support, the view that corporations can be liable for
violations of customary international law under the ATS is wrong. Customary, as opposed to treaty-based, international law has never recognized the imposition of direct duties on private corporations. Even if
some treaties impose direct liability on corporations in some instances
(as opposed to imposing obligations on states to regulate corporations),
such treaties do not support a general, across-the-board rule of imposing
direct liability on private corporations for any or all violations of customary international law. 3 Indeed, customary law has only endorsed direct private-actor liability in the context of international criminal law,
and even this somewhat-uncertain liability extends only to natural persons. 4 In sum, a survey of international legal sources would find embarrassingly little evidence of an international consensus (or even of international support) in favor of imposing liability on private corporations
for general violations of customary international law.
This lack of an international consensus is both surprising and troubling because, until very recently, U.S. courts have universally held that
the liability of private corporations satisfies the supposedly exacting
"specific, universal, and obligatory" standard, set forth by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,5 that customary

international law norms must meet in order to be invoked under the
ATS. 6 This standard, according to the Court, strictly limits the role of
federal courts in recognizing new and unsettled causes of action under
1996); Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1008 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2005); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 20
(D.D.C. 2000); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999).
2. Harold Hongju Koh, SeparatingMyth from Reality About CorporateResponsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 263, 264 (2004); Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand Human Rights: A
Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 461 (2001); see also Jordan J. Paust, Human
Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 802 (2002);
Beth Stephens, CorporateAccountability: InternationalHuman Rights Litigation Against Corporations in U.S. Courts, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAw 209, 219 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
3. See, e.g., Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal arts. 4(3), 9(5), Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57; see also id. art.
2(14) ("'Person' means any natural or legal person[.]"); Carlos M. Vizquez, Direct vs. Indirect
Obligations of Corporations Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 93336 (suggesting that most treaties that impose indirect liability on corporations require states to

regulate corporate entities).
4. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), adopted July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 ("The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this
Statute.").
5. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
6. Id. at 731-32.
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the ATS. 7 But, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum8 when it applied this
standard, corporate liability "is not a rule of customary international law
that we may apply under the ATS." 9
This Article has two goals. First and foremost, it offers the first comprehensive academic challenge to the widely held view that private corporations can be liable for violations of customary international law.
Second, the Article uses the rise of the pro-corporate-liability position to
undertake a broader assessment of post-Sosa lawmaking under the ATS.
In his concurrence in Sosa, Justice Scalia voiced skepticism about the
ability of federal courts to act as effective doorkeepers that would keep
out "new and debatable" causes of action, and he argued instead for a
complete ban on further judicial recognition of such causes of action.10 I
argue that the manner in which U.S. courts built a consensus that the
corporations could be liable under the ATS supports Justice Scalia's
skepticism about the system of judicial international lawmaking that is
authorized by Sosa.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I will review the rise of litigation under the ATS and the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Sosa,
which supposedly imposed rigorous limits on lawsuits that are brought
under the ATS. Part II will describe the rise of a judicial consensus in
the United States that holds that corporations can be held directly liable
for violations of customary international law and can therefore be subject to lawsuits under the ATS. Part III will critique this consensus and
conclude that there is no serious case to be made that corporations can
be liable for violations of customary international law, especially under
the supposedly heightened standard imposed by Sosa. Finally, I consider the reasons behind the rise of the flawed consensus on corporate liability. I argue that it reveals problems in the system of independent federal court lawmaking that is authorized by Sosa.

7. Id. at 724-29 (describing five reasons for "judicial caution when considering the kind of
individual claims" permitted under the Alien Tort Statute).
8. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL 3611392 (2d
Cir. Sept. 17, 2010); see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd. 504 F.3d 254, 321 (2d Cir.
2008) (Korman, J., dissenting).
9. Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at * 21.
10. Id. at 728, 739-51 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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THE DEBATE OVER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND THE SOSA
STANDARD

The Rise of the Modern ATS
Although originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,11

the ATS has only recently become the primary legal mechanism for the
direct application of customary international law in the U.S. court sys-

tem. Since its revival in 1980, U.S. courts have issued 173 opinions in
cases brought, at least in part, under the ATS.1 2 In almost all of those
cases, the plaintiffs pleaded violations of customary international law

under the ATS's grant of jurisdiction over cases involving "an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations." 3
Federal courts have traditionally invoked customary international law

in cases arising in admiralty,14 in cases involving interstate border disputes,' 5 and as a rule of interpretation,' 6 but the ATS has become the
major contemporary battleground for scholars and advocates debating
the proper role of customary international law in the U.S. judicial system.
7
did not cause seThe revival of the ATS in Fildrtigav. Peiia-Irala1
8
rious controversy initially.' Indeed, a survey of legal literature at the
time suggests that the decision was welcomed as identifying the longmissing entry point for international law and human-rights norms into
the U.S. legal system.19 As ATS cases became more frequent, legal
scholars and advocates began to herald the ATS as an important tool for
developing international law, especially international human rights
law. 20 The "norm development" theory of ATS litigation was especially
11. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
12. A list of the cases is on file with the author.

13. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
14. See, e.g., Mangone v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. 152 F. Supp. 848, 854 (E.D.N.Y.
1957) ("Maritime jurisprudence is part of the law of nations."); The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53
(1868) (same).
15. See, e.g., U.S. v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 166 (1965) (applying international law to determine territorial delimitation dispute between California and the U.S.).
16. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.").
17. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
18. Id. at 878.
19. See, e.g., James Crawford, Application of Customary InternationalLaw by National Tribunals, 76 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 231, 247-48 (1982); Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of
Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1122 n.54 (1982); Louis Henkin,
InternationalLaw: InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557
n.9 (1984) (citing Filartigaas an example of how international law can become domestic law).
20. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, How Is InternationalHuman Rights Law Enforced?, 74
IND. L.J. 1397, 1414 (1999) [hereinafter Koh, Human Rights Law] (describing how Fildrtigaand
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attractive because early ATS cases rarely resulted in enforceable money
judgments.2 1
Perhaps the most important theorist to use norm-development theory
to explain ATS litigation is Harold Koh. In a series of influential articles
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Koh used ATS litigation as a prominent example of how a "transnational legal process" can result in the incorporation of international legal norms by policymakers and courts. 22
By allowing advocates to gain entry into U.S. courts to pursue claims
under international law, Koh explained, ATS judgments resulted in the
development and, sometimes, the incorporation of international human
rights norms by U.S. policymakers and courts.2 3 This integration could
occur even if the ATS litigation was unsuccessful on the merits. Drawing upon the parallel theory of developing the civil-rights movement
through public-law litigation, Koh suggested that ATS litigation could
support a similar strategy for advocates of international human rights.2 4
Koh's theory accurately depicted many of the trends in ATS litigation. Although the number of enforced or collected judgments remained
modest, ATS litigation resulted in some of the most comprehensive discussions of the customary international law of human rights ever entertained by U.S. courts. For instance, in Siderman v. Argentina,25 the
Ninth Circuit offered a lengthy disquisition on the nature of jus cogens
and the status of torture under customary international law.26 Similarly,
and perhaps more significantly, the Second Circuit in Kadic v.
Karadzic27 held that private (as opposed to state) actors could be directly liable for serious violations of international human rights. 28 Putting
aside the actual judgments in both cases, the cases were significant because they represented perhaps the first time that U.S. courts had explored these types of international legal questions in depth. Kadic in
particular has had an important jurisprudential afterlife as a precedent
subsequent Alien Tort cases helped to build support for ban on torture); Harold Hongju Koh, The
1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HoUS. L. REv. 623, 646-55, 665-

66 (1998) (describing process of international law norm internalization and citation of Alien Tort
cases as example); see also Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of

1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J.INT'L L. 461, 489-93 (1989) (defending the use of Alien Tort
litigation to vindicate broader abstract norms); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2641 n.209 (1997) (noting failure of some international law
theorists to appreciate ability of Alien Tort litigation to internalize international legal norms).
21. Naomi Roht-Ariazza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT'L &

COMP. L. REv. 157, 166-68 (discussing paucity of enforced judgments against ATS defendants).
22. See supra note 20.
23. Koh, Human Rights Law, supra note 20, at 1415-16.
24. Id.

25.
26.
27.
28.

965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 714-19.
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 239.
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for cases and even prosecutions against non-state actors for violations of
international law.29
B.

The Backlash Against the ATS

The first notable dissent to Fildrtiga'srevival of the ATS was set
forth by then-Judge Robert Bork of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. In his well-known concurring opinion in
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arabian Republic,30 Judge Bork opined that the ATS
does not support a cause of action under international law. 31 Rather, the
ATS merely created jurisdiction in federal court. Congress must further
intervene, according to Bork, to create a cause of action for any particular claim of international law to be heard in federal courts. 32
Bork's "cause of action" critique of the ATS was rooted in a formalist notion of separation of powers that emphasized the control by the political branches over the formation of causes of action, especially when
such causes of action implicate foreign affairs. 33 By demanding congressional action before recognizing a cause of action under customary
international law, Bork was implicitly rejecting the vision of the ATS as
a mechanism for developing international law norms. Instead, Bork
sought to seal off federal courts from this process and shift the duty of
implementing international law norms to Congress and the President.34
Although powerful, Bork's separation-of-powers critique never
gained substantial currency outside of the D.C. Circuit. Most U.S.
courts that were presented with ATS cases assumed the power to also
recognize causes of action under customary international law, implicitly
or explicitly rejecting the Borkian critique.35 Scholars decried Bork's
narrow vision of international law and the judicial role in the development of international law. 36 Courts continue to follow a non-Borkian
approach, and cases brought under the ATS continue to be filed and decided.
In the late 1990s, the ATS became the subject of a second line of attack that was rooted in federalism. Because almost all early ATS cases
involved aliens suing other aliens, courts had to find a basis for federal
29. See infra Part II.A for a discussion ofKadic.
30. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
31. Id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
33. See id. at 801-04 (Bork, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
35. See, e.g., Chiminya Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995).
36. See Anthony D'Amato, Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92, 92-105 (1985). See generally Agora, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers?, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985).
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court subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Most courts, including the Filartiga court, concluded that ATS
cases created "federal questions," thereby satisfying Article III on the
theory that customary international law raised a question of federal
law.3 7
But the conclusion that customary international law is federal law is
hardly self-evident from the text of the Constitution, and it is similarly
not well supported in pre-Fildrtigaprecedent. For example, in a 1946
decision, Judge Learned Hand applied a rule of customary international
law under the assumption that it formed part of New York's state common law rather than part of federal law.38 Despite this uncertain doctrinal record, post-Filirtiga courts and academic defenders of the ATS
simply asserted that customary international law is federal common law
without offering a solid basis for such a conclusion.3 9 The most egregious example, as two of the sharpest ATS critics pointed out,40 can be
found in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the

United States's largely unsupported assertion that customary international law is federal common law.4 1
These two lines of attack on Filcirtiga- one rooted in separation of
powers and the other rooted in federalism - eventually migrated into
judicial considerations of ATS lawsuits. While early ATS defendants
were usually former foreign government officials, the second wave of
ATS lawsuits targeted U.S. and foreign corporations, and a third wave
was aimed primarily at U.S. government actors. 42 Each set of defendants fought back by raising the separation-of-powers and federalism objections to ATS lawsuits. President George W. Bush's administration
also intervened by taking a negative view of ATS lawsuits.4 3

37. Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
38. Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948); accord Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886). For further discussion of these and other decisions applying customary international law
as non-federal law, see Julian G. Ku, Customary InternationalLaw in State Courts, 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 265, 291-333 (2001).
39. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critiqueof the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815, 855-59 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique];A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, FederalCourts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1995).
40. Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 39, at 836-37.
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § § 14
cmt. D, 115 cmt. E (1987).
42. See Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on Terrorism, 19
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 105 (2005) (describing waves of ATS litigation).
43. See, e.g., Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, Doe v. Unocal Corp.,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628).
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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain

C.

The rising opposition to ATS litigation set the stage for the Supreme
Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain." Sosa involved a civil

lawsuit brought by Dr. Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national who alleged that he was abducted by Sosa at the behest of U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency officials. Alvarez-Machain sued both Sosa and the U.S.
agents.4 5 The defendants fought back and challenged the entire line of
Fildrtiga ATS cases on both separation-of-powers and federalism
grounds.4 6 As a matter of first impression for the Supreme Court, Sosa
was a decisive case for the future of the ATS.
Despite the sharp divisions among commentators and litigants leading up to the case, the Court reached a surprisingly high level of consensus. All members of the Court agreed with the defendants that the ATS
did not by itself create a cause of action for claims under customary international law; the ATS merely created jurisdiction. 7 All members of
the Court further expressed concern that existing and future ATS litigation could raise separation-of-powers problems by involving federal
courts in matters that implicate foreign affairs. 4 8 All members of the
Court agreed that the changes in the nature of common law after Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins 49 should sharply limit federal court applications of
such common law.50 All members of the Court further agreed that Alvarez-Machain's particular claim - that his detention violated customary
international law - was not sufficiently well-accepted and specific to
sustain his cause of action.
This agreement among justices did not, however, lead the Court to
eliminate the possibility of future ATS lawsuits. The Court went on to
uphold a limited federal court power in recognizing causes of action under customary international law.52 Such a power, the Court cautioned,
must be carefully used and only invoked to recognize causes of actions
that are specific, obligatory, and universally accepted. 53 The Court emphasized that, even where international law rules obtain undisputed acceptance as a general matter, they must be defined to a level of specificity that plainly encompasses the particular defendant's alleged
44. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
45. Id. at 697-99.

46.
47.
48.
cerns).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 712.
See id. at 743 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing agreement with majority opinion).
Id. at 746-47 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing agreement on separation-of-powers con304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 744 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 725 (majority opinion).
Id. at 731.
Id. at 732.
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conduct. 54 It is not sufficient to show agreement upon an abstract rule;
there must also be uncontroversial agreement that the defendant's specific alleged conduct violated that rule. This insistence on specificity reflects the Court's concern with the dangers of federal-court lawmaking.
Many rules might have widespread and universal agreement in the abstract while their application remains highly unsettled. Additionally, the
Court noted that the question of specificity includes the question of
"whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued."55
The importance of the specificity requirement was made clear in the
Court's application of this requirement to the facts in the Sosa case itself. While the Court accepted that a rule against arbitrary detention in
some forms might command universal agreement, there was insufficient
agreement that the specific conduct in Sosa, a detention for only one
day, violated that rule.5 6
In sum, under Sosa's approach, the fact that international law appears
to prohibit the defendant's conduct, or that international law contains a
universally recognized general principle arguably extending to the defendant's conduct, is insufficient to permit federal court jurisdiction.
Rather, the court must determine whether international law contains a
universally accepted rule and defines that rule specifically and uncontroversially to include defendant's alleged conduct.5 7 The Court reasoned that such a federal role, as long as it was sharply limited, would
not interfere with the concerns that all members of the Court shared
about judicial activity in this area.s
Despite these rather onerous-sounding requirements for the recognition of a cause of action, Justice Scalia and two other justices still found
this approach insufficiently restrictive of federal jurisdiction. While declaring his almost complete agreement with the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the majority's "reservation of a discretionary power in the Federal Judiciary to create causes of action for the enforcement of
international-law-based norms ... [that] would commit the Federal Ju-

diciary to a task it is neither authorized nor suited to perform." 59 Justice
Scalia suggested that leaving any discretion with federal courts would
lead inexorably to conflict and confrontation with Congress and the
President's management of foreign affairs.6 0 He further suggested that
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id. at 732-33 & nn.20-21 (describing "requirement of clear definition").
Id. at 733.
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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leaving such a role for federal courts was at odds with democratic selfgovernment.61
The agreement between the Souter majority and Scalia concurrence is
striking. Both agreed that the courts should play no role in creating
"new and debatable" causes of action or act in ways that would conflict
with the political branches or depart from international practice.62 Both
believed that courts should only be able to act in a very narrow set of
actions that would cause no disagreement at home or abroad.63
In fact, the only real difference between the majority and concurrence
lies in their different predictions about the subsequent behavior of federal courts in the administration of the ATS and customary international
law. The majority doubted that federal courts would cause such problems as long as they were subjected to strict limitations, while Justice
Scalia firmly predicted that such restrictions would prove ineffectual.
Notably, neither justice endorsed the more expansive conception of
the federal judiciary's role that had been embraced by academic advocates such as Koh. While Justice Souter thought federal courts should
not avert their gaze from international law, his endorsement of what he
believed were substantial and serious limitations on ATS activity hardly
fulfilled the normative goals of many ATS advocates to unleash a broad
federal court power to shape and develop international law. Yet, the
more suspicious Justice Scalia expressed fear that advocates would indeed take advantage of the small opening to push an aggressive agenda
that was at odds with the goals of the political branches.6 4
One issue that was left open by the Sosa Court provides a test (of
sorts) as to how federal courts would apply the ATS and fulfill these
different predictions.65 In a footnote, the majority noted that "[a] related
consideration" to the main determination as to whether a norm of customary international law is sufficiently well settled is "whether international law extends the scope of liability for violation of a given norm to
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a
corporation or individual."6 6 The question of whether and in what circumstances non-state actors could be liable for violations of customary
international law was, as the Court noted, an issue that could be subjected to the test for recognizing causes of action that was set forth by Sosa.
The next Part of this Article explains how the treatment of this issue by
lower courts confirms Justice Scalia's more pessimistic prediction.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 746 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring)
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring)
Id. at 732 n.20 (majority opinion).
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THE JUDICIAL CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF CORPORATE LIABILITY
UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

At the outset of Filartiga'sATS revolution, plaintiffs faced serious
challenges finding defendants against whom they could acquire jurisdiction. The most obvious defendants in many ATS cases are foreign sovereigns because ATS plaintiffs are always alleging a violation of public
international law. Indeed, under the traditional conception of public international law, only sovereign governments owe duties or responsibilities.67 Non-state parties, such as private individuals, organizations, or
corporations, owe duties under only domestic laws and cannot violate
international law directly.68
ATS plaintiffs that bring suit in U.S. courts against foreign sovereigns also have to overcome a general rule granting immunity to foreign
sovereigns in the domestic courts of another sovereign. 69 In general, early ATS plaintiffs sued former officials of foreign sovereigns rather than
the sovereigns themselves in order to avoid this immunity bar.70 Hence,
the defendants in Filartigawere former officials of the Paraguayan government.
While such defendants were not shielded by sovereign immunity,
they were often judgment-proof. 1 Nor did lawsuits against former govemment officials appear to have any serious deterrence effect on the actions of foreign sovereigns. Perhaps for this reason, ATS plaintiffs began to search for another set of defendants that would not only be able
to satisfy judgments, but that would also be deterred by actual or threatened ATS lawsuits enforcing international norms. This search naturally
turned up private multinational corporations who cooperated with or
worked with foreign sovereigns.

67. See id. ("A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability
for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor
such as a corporation or individual.").
68. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992).
69. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006) ("The Congress
finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity
from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect the
rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States courts.").
70. See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
71. For example, the original Filartiga plaintiffs won a S10.3 million judgment but were never able to collect that judgment against the defendant, who had been deported. See Fild.rtiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Philip A. Scarborough, Rules of Decision
for Issues Arising Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 459 n.16 (2007) (dis-

cussing problems of enforcing ATS judgments).
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The ATS and Corporations

The first reported ATS case against a corporate defendant was
brought in 1985, but the lawsuit was dismissed on other grounds and
never reached the question of whether a corporation was a proper defendant under customary international law. 72 This pattern continued during the first decade and a half of ATS litigation, with all reported decisions of lawsuits against corporations finding other grounds for
dismissal.7 3 Indeed, it is not even clear whether ATS defendants in these
cases raised the issue of corporate liability under customary international law.
Although it did not directly consider the amenability of corporations
to ATS lawsuits, the Second Circuit's decision in Kadic v. Karadzic74
took an important analytical step toward addressing corporate liability.
In Kadic, the defendant argued that, as a private party who was not acting under the authority of a foreign sovereign, he could not be liable for
violations of international law. 75 The defendant was the leader of a
breakaway regime of Serbs based in Bosnia, but it was not recognized
as a state nor was it part of the Yugoslav or Serbian governments. The
Kadic court concluded, after an extended discussion, that non-state actors such as the defendant could violate certain jus cogens norms of international law. 76 This conceptual leap laid an important foundation for
future ATS lawsuits against corporations.
For instance, the Kadic analysis played an important role in Doe v.
Unocal Corp.,77 the first major ATS lawsuit against a private corporation.7 In this case, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of

California permitted some of the ATS plaintiffs to proceed with a lawsuit alleging that a U.S.-based multinational corporation was complicit
in serious human rights abuses by the government of Burma.7 9 Like prior cases, the district court in Unocal did not analyze the specific question of whether a corporation, as opposed to a natural person, could be
72. Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371, 1381 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (transferring case because of
improper venue).
73. See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 112 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing a case against a corporation for lack of personal jurisdiction (service) and lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction (no cause of action for aiding and abetting)); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan,
Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 365-66 (E.D. La. 1997) (dismissing a case brought under ATS for lack of
cause of action and dismissing the case under TVPA for, among other things, corporation not an
"individual" who can be held liable under TVPA); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F.
Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
74. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
75. Id. at 239.
76. Id. at 239-40.
77. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
78. Id. at 883-84.
79. Id. at 891-92.
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liable for a violation of customary international law. But it did consider
the question in a more general sense. Defendant Unocal argued that, as a
private actor, it could not be directly liable for violations of international
law.80 Following the Second Circuit's decision in Kadic, the court found
that private liability could be attributed to a non-state actor. It did not
separately analyze whether a private corporation, as opposed to a natural person, could be liable under this theory. 82
Despite this omission, Unocal was a breakthrough for ATS plaintiffs
that were seeking redress against corporations. It relied on two possible
theories of liability. First, as discussed, it depended on a holding that
private non-state actors, including corporations, could be held directly
liable for certain serious violations of international law.83 Second, and
more mundanely, it depended on a finding that corporations could be
held liable for complicity with -

or aiding and abetting -

sovereign

states that were themselves committing serious violations of international law. 84
The second theory of liability became the focus of most subsequent
litigation because few ATS corporate defendants were alleged to have
committed international law violations directly. Most corporate ATS defendants, at worst, were alleged to have been complicit in such violations. The litigation on this front, accompanied by substantial academic
discussion,85 focused on what the standards for complicity should be
and whether those standards should be drawn from international or domestic law. This latter dispute is important for the purposes of this Article because, if the question of complicity is also a question of international law, the complicity theory of liability also depends on the
assumption that a private corporation can violate international law.
But the question of corporate liability remained unexplored. Subsequent decisions in the Unocal litigation at the circuit-court level did not
even address the question. 86 Instead, that Court focused on the difficult
question of complicity and ended up with enough divisions on that point
to avoid reaching the corporate liability question.87 Other courts hearing
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 890.
Id.
Id. at 891.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Chimene I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60

HASTINGS L.J. 61, 103 (2008) (concluding that "international law, not federal common law, governs the standards for accomplice liability at both the jurisdictional and merits stages"); Ryan A.
Tyz, Searching for a Corporate Liability Standard Under the Alien Tort Claims Act in Doe v.

Unocal, 82 OR. L. REV. 559, 580 (2003) (arguing for the adoption of the federal common law
standard of reckless disregard standard corporate liability under the ATS).
86. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
87. See id. at 948-49 (applying international complicity standard); id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J.,
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ATS lawsuits against corporations either accepted the Kadic privateactor analysis or simply did not analyze the question at all while still
permitting lawsuits to go forward against corporations. 8
The development of corporate liability in the Eleventh Circuit illustrates how courts adopted the doctrine with almost no reflection or analysis. Corporate defendants had been the subjects of ATS lawsuits in the
courts within the Eleventh Circuit since 1999 without the courts taking
any notice of the corporate liability issue. 89 Indeed, no court in the circuit analyzed the question until 2008 when the Eleventh Circuit announced that:
The text of the Alien Tort Statute provides no express exception
for corporations and the law of this Circuit is that this statute
grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate
defendants. 90
Amazingly, this paragraph constituted the court's entire analysis of
the corporate liability question. What makes this short, conclusory assertion so curious is that the court claimed 9 ' that it was bound by its prior decision in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce.92 But, while Aldana
did analyze the question of whether the defendants' alleged conduct
constituted torture, the Aldana court did not address the corporate liability question at all.93 Despite this lack of analysis by the prior court, or
even an acknowledgement of the corporate liability issue, the Drummond court then went on to claim that it was "bound by ... precedent"

on the corporate liability question without offering its own analysis. 94
The Eleventh Circuit in Sinaltrainalv. Coca-Cola9 5 did the same, thus
concurring) (applying federal complicity standard).
88. See, e.g., Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 99-100 (D.D.C.
2003) (adopting the Kadic private actor analysis and finding that defendants could be sued under
the ATS as accomplices, aiders and abetters, or co-conspirators); Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1261 (N,D. Ala. 2003) (allowing the ATS claim to go forward
without answering the corporate question for purposes of a motion to dismiss because plaintiffs
adequately alleged that defendants violated customary international law); Sinaltrainal v. CocaCola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1352-53 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (permitting lawsuit to go forward
against corporations but not considering the issue on the grounds that general allegations that defendants acted under color of state law is all that is necessary at the motion to dismiss stage);
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d. 424, 442-45 (D.N.J. 1999) (concluding that plaintiff
had jurisdiction to proceed against a corporate defendant without analyzing the corporate issue
because the defendants were defacto state actors because they acted as an agent of, or in concert
with, the German Reich).
89. See, e.g., Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d. at 424; Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.
90. Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc. 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (1Ith Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 1315.
92. 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005).
93. Id. at 1247-53.
94. Drummond, 552 F.3d at 1315.
95. 578 F.3d 1252 (1lth Cir. 2009).
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establishing, without any discussion or analysis, the doctrine of corporate ATS liability in the Eleventh Circuit. 96
B.

Talisman

The Eleventh Circuit's approach to corporate liability reflects the approach taken by most federal courts. Indeed, prior to the Second Circuit's recent decision in Kiobel, only two courts had attempted serious
judicial analyses of a private corporation's liability under the ATS. 97
All other decisions that have noted the existence of the corporate liability question have typically cited either or both of these opinions with
approval.98 A discussion of these two opinions, therefore, represents a
fair (and, indeed, quite comprehensive) survey of U.S. judicial thinking
on the question of ATS corporate liability.
The more thorough and detailed discussion of these two cases is
PresbyterianChurch of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 99 a case involving a Canadian corporation accused of complicity in international law
violations committed by Sudan's government.100 The Talisman Court's
discussion of corporate liability is built on two foundations: First, that
U.S. case law "make[s] it clear that corporations can be held liable for
jus cogens violations";' 0 and second, that "international precedent and
practice reveals that corporate liability, at least forjus cogens violations,
is contemplated under international law." 02
Although the Talisman court relied heavily on U.S. case law to support its conclusion, none of the cases it relied upon actually held, or
even explicitly analyzed, whether a private corporation can be liable
under international law.1 03 Because none of the decisions ended in a
dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over a private corporation, the Talisman court counted each decision as precedent in favor of
corporate liability under international law.104 In fact, although each case
96. Id. at 1263.

97. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 55-59 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. (Talisman 1), 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 308-19
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
98. See, e.g., Agent Orange,373 F. Supp. 2d at 52; In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp.
2d 538, 545-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
99. 244 F. Supp. 2d 289.
100. Id. at 296.
101. Talisman 1, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
102. Id. at 315.
103. See id. at 313 (noting that "[w]hile the Second Circuit has not explicitly held that corporations are potentially liable for violations of the law of nations ... [it has] acknowledged that
corporations are potentially liable for violations of the law of nations that ordinarily entail individual responsibility, includingjus cogens violations"); see also id. at 314-15 (citing numerous
cases upholding subject-matter jurisdiction over corporate defendants).
104. Id. at 313.
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did indeed involve an ATS defendant, not one of the decisions even addressed the question of whether a private corporation could violate international law.' 0 5 Nor is it clear that the argument was even raised by
ATS defendants.
Indeed, as I have noted above, no prior U.S. court directly (or indirectly) had analyzed the liability of a private corporation under customary international law. Yet, the Talisman court relied heavily on the fact
that no U.S. court had ever rejected this theory of corporate liability under international law, thereby assuming that all prior U.S. courts endorsed the theory. As a formal matter, federal courts cannot dismiss a
case on any ground without having first determined the existence of
subject-matter jurisdiction.1 06 But, while this might be .true as a formal
matter, it is also true that no U.S. court ever analyzed the issue prior to
Talisman.

The analytical foundation for the Talisman court's holding lies in
Kadic v. Karadzic.107 In Kadic, the defendant Karadzic argued that because customary international law governed only state-to-state relations
and that private parties owed no duties under it, he, as a private actor,
was legally incapable of violating customary international law.' 08
The Second Circuit rejected this defense and held that "certain forms
of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals."' 0 9 In the
past, non-state actors such as pirates and slave traders were considered
hosti humani generis and punished for violations of international law. 1 o
This precedent for punishing non-state actors for certain serious international violations of "universal concern" had modern analogues in the
prohibition of genocide, torture, and certain war crimes. In the cases of
such serious jus cogens violations, the Kadic court reasoned, non-state
actors could be held liable even without any pretense of state authority. III
Kadic thus provides the precedential basis (in the United States) for
extending liability beyond state actors for certain seriousjus cogens violations. But Kadic did not address the question of whether all private ac105. Id. at 312-13 (acknowledging additional cases that do not address the corporate liability
issue in discussing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 475-79 (2d Cir. 2002), Bigio v. CocaCola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 447-48 (2d Cir. 2000), and Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226

F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 2000)).
106. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876-77 (2010); Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (requiring federal court to determine existence of subject-matter jurisdiction prior to resolving the existence of a cause of action).
107. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
108. Id. at 238.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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tors, including private corporations, could be held equally liable. Still,
the fact that courts subsequent to Kadic did not reject subject-matter jurisdiction in ATS cases involving corporate defendants, according to the
Talisman court, meant that the U.S. courts had extended jus cogens liability to such defendants.l 12
The court then buttressed its argument with international precedents.
Explicitly borrowing the analysis of a law-review article by Steven Ratner,1 13 the court relied on precedents from trials of Nazi-era war criminals after World War II and international treaties that have imposed obligations on corporations. 1 14 As for the Nazi cases, the court conceded
that the key Allied tribunal tasked with punishing businesses that had
cooperated with the Nazis did not punish any corporations.' 5 Rather,
such tribunals uniformly punished the individuals who owned and managed the corporate entities. Although no corporation was punished, the
Talisman court relied on the Allied tribunal's descriptions of "firms"
committing crimes to seek support for private corporation liability."16
As for international treaty precedents, the court noted that a number
of international regulatory treaties directly imposed duties on private individuals, and some even defined such individuals as both private and
corporate." 7 While most treaties did not bind corporations, the court
concluded that because some treaties could hold parties liable for unintentional torts suggests that "they can be held liable for intentional torts
such as complicity in genocide, slave trading, or torture."' 1" As I will
argue in Part III, these precedents do not establish the international support that the Talisman court claimed.
C.

The Effect of Sosa

After the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Sosa, Talisman Energy
reiterated its argument on corporate liability and invoked the heightened
and rigorous Sosa standard for determining the existence of a cause of
action under customary international law.' 19 But, in a later district court
opinion on the dispute, Talisman II,120 the Southern District of New
112. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. (Talisman 1), 244 F. Supp. 2d
289, 308-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
113. Ratner, supra note 2 (arguing that international law can and should provide for obligations of corporate responsibility and accountability for human rights protection and that the scope
of these obligations must be determined in light of the characteristics of corporate activity).
114. Talisman 1,244 F. Supp. 2d at 315-16.
115. Id. at 311.
116. Id. at 316.
117. Id. at 316-17.
118. Id. at 317.

119. Id
120. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. (Talisman II), 374 F. Supp. 2d
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York refused to depart from its earlier holding. Because U.S. cases subsequent to Sosa had failed to dismiss corporate defendants,12 1 the Talisman II court found no reason to depart from its prior decision. 122 Moreover, the Talisman defendants' observation that no treaty or
international tribunal decision had ever imposed liability on a corporation for violations ofjus cogens crimes did not resolve the question. Rather, the burden lay on the Talisman defendants to establish the nonexistence of a rule of corporate liability. According to the court, the lack
of any objection by member states, including Talisman's home country
of Canada, was strong evidence of the existence of corporate liability
for customary international law.123
As I will explain below, there are good reasons to doubt this understanding of how one should determine customary international law. Indeed, as the Eastern District of New York (the only other pre-Kiobel
court to analyze this issue) noted, international sources appear to support the view of the Talisman defendants. In Agent Orange,124 Judge
Jack Weinstein noted the weaknesses in the plaintiffs international
precedential support from the Nazi-era cases as well as the lack of jurisdiction over corporations in the ICC statute or the two main UN ad hoc
international criminal tribunals.125 Yet Judge Weinstein rejected the defendants' argument on two grounds: First, he reiterated the Talisman
court's view that the long line of ATS cases against corporations inher-

ently affirmed the existence of corporate liability;126 and second, he noted that there was no obvious policy reason against imposing liability on
corporations for customary international law violations. 127 After all,
corporations under domestic law are commonly and uncontroversially
held liable for violations.128
Subsequent courts continued to follow the holding, if not the logic, of
Talisman and Agent Orange. Until Kiobel, courts considering ATS law-

or simply assuits against corporations barely analyzed the issuel29
30
sumed jurisdiction with a simple citation of Talisman.o

331 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
121. See id. at 335 (discussing Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696 (2d Cir. 2004) and
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 406 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2003)).
122. Talisman II, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 335-37.
123. Id. at 337.
124. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
125. Id. at 55-57.
126. Id. at 58.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 59.

129. See, e.g., supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (discussing Eleventh Circuit doctrine).
130. See In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Essentially, the argument for corporate liability under the ATS rests
on the failure of the U.S. courts even to spot the issue for decades. The
long line of cases not discussing the issue became, oddly, the precedent
(even binding precedent in some cases) for deciding that such liability
was accepted. In a similar twist of logic, the lack of any international
precedent against such a finding became further support for the existence of corporate liability. At the center of this analysis is the first district court decision in Talisman, which remains the most influential
statement of a U.S. judicial consensus in favor of corporate ATS liability.
D.

The FirstCrack in the Consensus: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum

This curious and flawed judicial consensus on corporate liability under the ATS was finally shattered in September 2010 when the Second
Circuit issued Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.13 ' Kiobel involved an
ATS lawsuit by Nigerian plaintiffs against an oil company for allegedly
aiding and abetting human-rights violations by the Nigerian government. 132 The majority opinion in Kiobel held that actions against corporations alleging violations of customary international law cannot sustain
jurisdiction under the ATS.13 1
The Kiobel majority's holding rests on two points: First, that customary international law, rather than domestic law, governs the question of
whether a corporation can be liable under the ATS;1 34 and second, that
corporate liability is not a norm of customary international law of sufficient specificity and universality to sustain a cause of action under the
ATS.13 ' Therefore, liability under the ATS extends only to states and
natural persons, not corporations. 136 As I will argue in Part III, the Kiobel majority was correct on both of these important points.
What is important to note here, however, is not simply that the Kiobel
majority's decision was rightly decided. Rather, the points of agreement
between the Kiobel majority and concurrence confirm that the prior judicial consensus on corporate liability under the ATS was deeply flawed
and unsustainable. Although sharply worded, it is worth noting that the
concurrence by Judge Leval did not disagree with the Kiobel majority
on a fundamental point. Judge Leval agreed that there was little or no
131. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL 3611392 (2d
Cir. Sept. 17, 2010).
132. Id. at *5.
133. Id. at *23.
134. Id. at *7- 11.
135. Id. at *11-21.
136. See id. at *21.
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international precedent to support imposing liability on corporations
under customary international law.' 37 In doing so, he distanced himself
from the reasoning and analysis offered by the Talisman courts. Rather,
Judge Leval's main disagreement with the majority was how to interpret
the consequences of the lack of international law precedents in favor of
corporate liability under the ATS. In Leval's view, because international
law does not speak to this question with respect to civil remedies, states
like the United States are free to enforce such remedies against corporations.'38
The novel reasoning of Leval's support for corporate liability illustrates the weaknesses of the prior judicial development of corporate liability under the ATS. It is striking that Leval's opinion is the first time
that this new defense of corporate liability has been articulated by a
court, even though courts had accepted jurisdiction of cases against corporations for over twenty-five years. Moreover, the focus of Leval's
disagreement with the majority illustrates the larger question that is
raised by the debate over corporate liability: How much authority
should federal courts have under the ATS to "create" legal remedies that
are not specifically sanctioned by Congress? The majority in Kiobel
plainly believed that recognizing a norm of corporate liability went beyond the proper role of independent judicial lawmaking, while the concurrence did not reach this conclusion. Regardless of where one falls on
this question, the proper role of federal courts remains the central question in contemporary ATS cases, just as it was the central dividing line
between the majority and concurrence in Sosa itself.
The Scholarly Contributionto the Consensus on Corporate
Liability
Unlike U.S. courts, most scholars who considered the issue recognized the difficulties and complexities of holding corporations liable
under the ATS for customary international law violations. Moreover, as
my discussion of the academic literature below argues, ATS litigation
was, for most scholars, simply a smaller subset of a larger normative
campaign to apply international norms to corporations. The emergence
of this interest within the legal literature coincided with the first ATS
cases against corporations, but it was part of a broader shift in interest
E.

137. Id. at *43 (Leval, J., concurring) ("However, when one looks to international law to learn
whether it imposes civil compensatory liability on those who violate its norms and whether it distinguishes between natural and juridical persons, the answer international law furnishes is that it
takes no position on the question.").
138. Id. (Leval, J., concurring) ("But international law does not provide that juridical entities
are exempt. And as for civil liability of both natural and juridical persons, the answer given by the
law of nations (as discussed above) is that each State is free to decide that question for itself.").
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among scholars toward the role of multinational corporations in the
world sphere. This interest was reflected in an early effort by the United
Nations to articulate global norms governing conduct by multinational
corporations.139 Although much of the early academic consideration of
these questions made strong normative claims for holding corporations
accountable for international human rights law obligations, few claimed
that the applicability of such law to corporations was settled or obvious.1 40 Yet, academic scholarship has been a crucial factor in the creation of a U.S. consensus on ATS corporate liability. In determining
whether there is private corporate liability for violations of jus cogens,
U.S. courts have essentially adopted wholesale the views of U.S. international law scholars.
The clearest example of the connection between scholarship and the
courts is Professor Steven Ratner's 2001 article exploring a theory for
holding private corporations responsible for international human rights
obligations'41 - an article that the Talisman court explicitly cited in
reaching its holding.142 Ratner's article self-consciously refused to focus
specifically on the ATS context in order to derive a more general theory.14 3 Nor did Ratner make the claim that international law at that time
already recognized international law duties for corporations in the context of human rights. Indeed, some of his other work was cited for the
proposition that no consensus yet existed.'" His purpose was to offer an
analytical framework that could lead to the recognition of such duties.

He explains: "My thesis is that international law should and can provide
for [international duties on corporations], and that the scope of these obligations must be determined in light of the characteristics of corporate
activity." 4 5
139. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on
the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
140. See Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in US. Courts: Enforcing Human
Rights at the Corporate Level, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1212 (1999); Richard L. Herz, Litigating
Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A PracticalAssessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L
L. 545, 638 (2000); Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing MultinationalCorporationsin the U.S. for Violating
InternationalLaw, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81 (1999) (arguing that the ATS is al-

ready sufficiently limited by existing court doctrines - for example, forum non conveniens
and a heavy burden on plaintiffs).
141. Ratner, supra note 2.
142. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
143. Id. at 450-51.
144. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES ININTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 16 (2d ed. 2001) ("It
remains unclear ... whether international law generally imposes criminal responsibility on
groups and organizations.").
145. Ratner, supra note 2, at 449 (emphasis added).
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Ratner then reviewed the international precedents on private corporate duties arguing that there is a "clear trend" toward the recognition of
corporate duties.146 He examined the World War II cases against Nazi
industrialists, certain treaty regimes that impose duties on business enterprises, treaty interpretation bodies, European Union treaties, and soft
law on corporate responsibility. 147 The Talisman court relied on most of
these same sources and essentially the same analysis to reach its conclusion. Unlike the Talisman court, however, Ratner describes this evidence as reflecting a "somewhat inconsistent posture among decisionmakers over the role of corporations in the international legal
order."1 48 Although corporations have many recognized rights under international law, many governments are "somewhat ambivalent" about
recognizing corporate duties. 14 9 Still, Ratner concludes that many decisionmakers recognized that "corporate behavior is a fitting subject for
international regulation."1 50 But Ratner does not claim, nor was it the
burden of his article to establish, that there was wide international consensus on the existence of private corporation duties under customary
international law. Yet, this is exactly the burden that the Talisman court
used Ratner's analysis to establish.
Other scholars have been less reluctant than Ratner to defend corporate liability under the ATS. Harold Koh, for instance, adapted Ratner's
arguments to sharply criticize opponents of corporate liability as spreading "myths." 5 1 Such myths about the inability of private corporations to
owe duties under customary international law, Koh argued, are refuted
by evidence of Nazi-era prosecutions and subsequent treaty practice.152
Moreover, Koh emphasizes the illogic and perhaps injustice of recognizing private corporation rights under customary international law
while at the same time immunizing such entities from duties.153
The unfairness of immunizing corporations from liability is a common theme to scholars defending this position. As Beth Stephens argued, to the extent that international law obligations extend to non-state
actors, there is no basis for limiting such extensions to natural per-

146. Id. at 477.

147. Id. at 477-88.
148. Id at 487.
149. Id. at 488.

150. Id.
151. Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate Responsibility Liti-

gation, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 263, 263 (2004) (discussing several challenges to ATS corporate
claims, particularly by conceptualizing the corporate person and the legal basis for liability in civil claims).
152. Id. at 264-68.
153. Id. at 265.
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sons. 154 Thus far, there has been almost no academic dissent to these arguments.
Outside the United States, scholars have noted the significance of the
ATS revolution in corporate liability. Indeed, one non-U.S. scholar arguing in favor of the International Criminal Court's assertion of jurisdiction over corporations found U.S. cases to be an important precedent."' But, neither she nor other scholars describe the ATS cases as a
reflection of a well-known international consensus in favor of corporate
liability for these kinds of violations. 156
The pre-Kiobeljudicial consensus for the liability of corporations under international law rested on a very thin reed. Although ATS cases
have been brought against U.S. corporations for over two decades, only
three courts directly addressed the question of a corporation's liability
for jus cogens violations. Ironically, the two courts allowing corporate
liability relied heavily on the failure of prior courts to analyze or even
spot the issue as evidence that precedent favors imposing such liabilities. Only the Kiobel court conducted a fresh analysis, and even its concurring judge agreed there was very little international law precedent
supporting a norm of corporate liability. 15 7 Once endorsed by these two
lower courts, most subsequent courts treated the question as settled or
continued to ignore the issue.158
This questionable approach to precedent is further exacerbated by
these courts' heavy reliance on legal scholarship on the level of international consensus on the question of corporate liability. While such
scholarship argued for a tentative trend toward corporate liability, such
articles failed to establish the existence of a universal acceptance of the
norm at the level of specificity required by the Sosa Court. 159 In the next
154. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 209.
155. Kathryn Haigh, Extending the International Criminal Court's Jurisdiction to Corporations: Overcoming Complementarity Concerns, 14 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTs. 199, 208 (2008) (noting
that "many of the key developments in pursuing corporate liability for human rights violations
have been through civil litigation" under the ATS).
156. See BINDA PREET SAHNI, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE LIABILITY: ACCOUNTABILITY

FOR HUMAN INJURY 311-12 (2006); Michael K. Addo, Human Rights and TransnationalCorporations-

An Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS

AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF

TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 3, 4 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999); Nicola Jilgers, The Legal
Status of the Multinational Corporation Under International Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra, at 259, 267-

68.
157. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL 3611392, at
*43 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010) (Leval, J., concurring) ("However, when one looks to international
law to learn whether it imposes civil compensatory liability on those who violate its norms and
whether it distinguishes between natural and juridical persons, the answer international law furnishes is that it takes no position on the question.").
158. See discussionsupra Part II.A.
159. See supra note 142.
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Part, I discuss the international sources on corporate liability under customary international law.
III. THE NON-EXISTENT INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON PRIVATE
CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
VIOLATIONS

Under Sosa, federal courts are obligated to limit their recognition of
causes of action under customary international law to those norms that
are "specific, universal, and obligatory."1 60 The requirement of specificity includes questions of whether a private actor can be held liable under
international norms. 16 1 Hence, all courts that have considered this question have sought to establish that there is wide and universal international consensus that private corporations owe duties under customary
international law or at least forjus cogens violations. As I will detail in
this Part, the question of private corporation liability is far from universally settled under customary international law. The traditional rule of
international law limiting rights and duties to states has only been partially abrogated. Moreover, neither historic nor contemporary international precedents establish a consensus in favor of imposing liability on
private corporations, particularly with respect to violations ofjus cogens
norms.
A.

The Basisfor Non-State Actor Liabilityfor Violations of
InternationalLaw

Under traditional international law, legal rights and duties flowed between sovereigns alone. As a leading treatise explains:
States are the principal subjects of international law. This means
that international law is primarily a law for the international conduct of States, and not of their citizens. As a rule, the subjects of
the rights and duties arising from international law are states
solely and exclusively, and international law does not normally
impose duties or confer rights directly upon an individual human
being .... 162

Hence, non-state actors could not in their own capacity make claims
against states. Non-state actors who suffered injuries at the hands of foreign sovereigns, for instance, could only seek recovery under international law through their states of nationality. For this reason, determining nationality has been a crucial factor both for natural persons and for
160. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
161. Id. at 733 n.20.
162. OPPENHEIM, supra note 68, at 16.
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legal persons when seeking remedies under traditional international law.
In one famous case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected under international law the right of Belgium to bring claims against Spain
on behalf of a corporation that was registered under the laws of Canada.163 The ICJ rejected this claim even though the majority of shareholders claiming injury were nationals of Belgium.'6
These formal and rigid categories of traditional international law began to relax in the aftermath of World War II and the rise of the international human rights movement. As Paul Stephan has observed, modern
international law self-consciously sought to impose duties on states toward individuals. 6 5 Yet, even human rights treaties impose duties on
states to grant rights to individuals rather than granting rights to individuals directly. This preserves the traditional conception of international law obligations flowing between states and applying only indirectly toward individuals.1 66
The expansion of individual rights under international law occurred
at the same time that international law began to impose duties on individuals in their private capacity. The most famous example of this phenomenon was the imposition of criminal liability on individuals by international tribunals formed by the victorious Allied Powers in World
War II. As the Nuremberg tribunal famously proclaimed: "[t]hat international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as
upon states has long been recognized."1 67 Quoting the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Tribunal declared that "[c]rimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law

be enforced."1 68
"[Tlhe major legal significance of the [Nuremberg] judgments
lies. . . in those portions of the judgments dealing with the area of personal responsibility for international law crimes."l69 But the innovation
of Nuremberg, however, was not simply that individuals could be punished for violations of international law. Rather, responsibility extended
163. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
164. Id. at 6.
165. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law - Legitimacy, Accountability,
Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1555, 1556-62 (1999);
see also Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations, 85
MINN. L. REv. 71, 79-88 (2000).
166. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (2d ed. 2005).
167. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (I.M.T. at Nurnberg 1946).
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 244 n.18 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting TELFORD
TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES

TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 109 (1949) (emphasis in original)).
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to individuals even when their conduct was explicitly sanctioned or
even required by their country of nationality (in this case, Germany).
The result of these developments is that certain forms of international
law extended the scope of its protections to nationals against their own
states (international human rights law) and other forms of international
law extended the scope of its duties to individuals (international humanitarian law). 170 Although revolutionary, these developments did not replace the traditional operation of international law via state-to-state relations. Treaties continued to operate by imposing duties on states to
respect and guarantee rights, never directly imposing obligations or
granting rights to natural or legal persons, and states remained the primary bearers of rights and obligations under international law. Customary law followed the same indirect approach with the sole exception of
serious international crimes like genocide and war crimes. Charges aris-

ing from such serious international crimes, however, have only been directed toward natural persons.
B.

The World War II IndustrialistCases
Nevertheless, U.S. courts and scholars have suggested that the mili-

tary tribunals established to punish World War II war criminals went
even further than described above. The Talisman I court held that U.S.
military tribunals also punished corporations for violations of international law by aiding and supporting the Nazi regime's war crimes. 17 1
But none of these tribunals actually charged corporations. Instead, they
charged the natural persons who controlled such corporations. Despite
the restricted nature of these prosecutions, defenders of corporate liability have focused on the language of such opinions in cases against officers of German corporations, concluding that the opinions "make[] it
clear that while individuals were nominally on trial, the [corporation]
itself, acting through its employees, violated international law."' 72
This analysis is based almost entirely on the language of two opinions from U.S. military tribunals established by Control Council Law
No. 10 after the initial Nuremberg tribunals completed their work.
While applying international law, many of the judges in the subsequent
Control Council Law No. 10 tribunals were, unlike the judges in the
170. For a discussion of the evolution of the individual in international law under international human rights law and international humanitarian law, see Andrew Clapham, The Role of the
Individual in InternationalLaw, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 25 (2010); see also Note, CorporateLiability
for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2025, 2031 nn.43-44
(2001).
171. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. (Talisman 1), 244 F. Supp. 2d
289, 315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
172. Id. at 316.
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more famous Nuremberg Tribunals, all U.S. lawyers.1 73 Such judges
were likely accustomed to imposing criminal liability on corporations
because U.S. law had long done so, 174 and it is hardly surprising that
their opinions reflect some imprecise language. But, read in context, the
language hardly suggests that the judges believed they were holding
corporations liable.
The first such passage involves the tribunal's finding with regard to
I.G. Farben in a case brought against its corporate directors.
With reference to the charges in the present indictment concerning Farben's [a German corporation] activities in Poland,
Norway, Alsace-Lorraine, and France, we find that the proof establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that offenses against property as defined in Control Council Law No. 10 were committed by
Farben, and that these offenses were connected with, and an inextricable part of the German policy for occupied countries. . . .
The action of Farben and its representatives, under these circumstances, cannot be differentiated from acts of plunder or pillage
committed by officers, soldiers, or public officials of the German
Reich.... Such action on the part of Farben constituted a viola-

tion of the Hague Regulations [on the conduct of warfare].175
In a similar case, the tribunal noted that "the confiscation of the Austin plant [a French tractor factory owned by the Rothschilds] ... and its

subsequent detention by the Krupp firm constitute a violation of Article
43 of the Hague Regulations . . . [and] the Krupp firm, through defendants[,] ... voluntarily and without duress participated in these violations . ...

176

Although such passages suggest that the tribunals were seeking to
punish the businesses and their activities, 7 7 the tribunals at the time
clarified their analysis to make it clear that they were not charging the
corporations directly:
173. All members of the Farben tribunal constituted under Control Council 10 were U.S. lawyers. Two were state-court judges, one was a dean of a law school, and one was a practicing attorney. See 7 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 6 (1952) [hereinafter CCL NO. 10 TRIALS].
174. See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 496-97
(1909).
175. Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 315-16 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Krauch (I.G. Farben Case), in 8 CCL NO. 10 TRIALS, supra note 173, at 1140 (1952)).
176. Ratner, supra note 2, at 478 n.134 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Krupp, in 9 CCL No. 10 TRIALS, supra note 173, at 1352-53 (1950)). As in the I.G. Farben Case,
the Krupp court makes it clear that while individuals were nominally on trial, the Krupp company
itself, acting through its employees, violated international law.
177. For example, Judge Leval made much of this and similar passages in his stinging Kiobel
concurrence. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL
3611392, at *47-48 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010) (Leval, J., concurring).
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We will now turn to the consideration of the individual responsibility of the defendants for the acts of spoliation [in various countries].... It is appropriate here to mention that the corporate defendant, Farben, is not before the bar of this Tribunal
and cannot be subjected to criminalpenalties in these proceed-

ings. We have used the term "Farben" as descriptive of the instrumentality of cohesion in the name of which the enumerated
acts of spoliation were committed. But corporationsact through
individuals and, under the conception of personal individual
guilt to which previous reference has been made, the prosecution, to discharge the burden imposed upon it in this case, must
establish by competent proofbeyond a reasonable doubt that an
individual defendant was either a participantin the illegal act or
that, being aware thereof he authorizedor approved it.178

It is noteworthy that when U.S.-trained prosecutors and U.S.-trained
judges sought to punish the business activities of corporations, all of
them chose to act by charging the individual officers or owners of these
corporations rather than the corporation itself. For instance, where a
business was charged with supplying Zyklon B gas to Nazi concentration camps, the Nuremberg prosecutions were against the individual
who owned the firm, his immediate deputy, and the senior technical expert for the firm; the firm itself was not the subject of the criminal prosecution.179 While it is the business conduct that gives rise to liability in
these trials, it is almost stunning to a U.S. lawyer to "pierce" the corporate veil and attribute the actions of a corporation to an individual."so
The U.S.-trained lawyers who ran these tribunals may have intended to
punish the corporations at issue here, but the only punishments were inflicted on natural persons like Krupp and Krauch.
Why did the tribunals refuse to try the corporations directly? This
question has been the subject of a recent detailed historical investigation
178. I.G. Farben Case, 8 CCL No. 10 TRIALS, supra note 173, at 1153 (emphasis added).
179. See In re Tesch and Others (Zyklon B Case), 13 Ann. Dig. 250 (British Mil. Court
1946).
180. Whether as unaffiliated individuals or as members of organizations, the accused were
natural persons, not legal entities. Provision was made for declaring and proving that "the group
or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization." Charter of
the International Military Tribunal art. 9, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. The effect, however, was not enterprise liability, but rather to make membership in such an organization
a punishable offense - to give a signatory state "the right to bring individuals to trial for membership [in the criminal organization]." Id. art. 10. Similarly, Control Council Law No. 10 speaks
only of punishment of "persons," not entities; of "war criminals and others similar offenders, other than those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal;" and of "[t]he delivery ... of persons for trial." Control Council Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, pmbl., art. V, reprinted in 1 CCL No.
10 TRIALS, supra note 173, at xvi, xix (1949).
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by Jonathan Bush.' 8 ' Based on interviews with surviving participants
and a review of various underlying documents, Bush discovered that a
number of prosecutors did indeed consider charging the German businesses directly. But Bush has been unable to find a single explanation
for why this plan was eventually rejected or dropped. 182 He suggests
that the failure to prosecute the corporations directly was a result of a
combination of factors, including Allied interest in maintaining the
German economic structure, the weariness of "awaken[ing] legal concerns" with a somewhat controversial and novel legal move, and the evidentiary difficulties of prosecuting entities with complex structures.' 8 3
It is likely that all of these reasons contributed to the ultimate decision. But whatever the reason, Bush acknowledges that it is simply
wrong for courts and scholars to suggest that these trials provide an important precedent for imposing international law duties on corporations.184 Not only did the courts explicitly avoid such a theory, but
Bush's investigation also makes it clear that they considered and rejected this option. Nuremberg and related tribunals have an honored and
iconic place in the modem development of international law. It is not
surprising that courts and scholars have tried to rely on these decisions
as supportive precedent. Unfortunately, the practice of these tribunals
provides no meaningful support to the imposition of legal liability on
private corporations under customary international law.
C.

ContemporaryInternationalPrecedents

Nuremberg established the principle of responsibility of natural individuals or states for certain violations of international law. This expansion of liability for the most serious violations of international law has
been confirmed by subsequent international practice in the criminal tribunals that were established in the 1990s. But such tribunals also confirm the limitation of liability to natural persons. The tribunals' limited
view is also shared by the most recent effort of the United Nations Human Rights Council to foster international norms regulating transnational corporations.
1.

InternationalCriminal Tribunals

The successors to the World War II tribunals were the international
criminal tribunals established by the United Nations to prosecute war
181. Jonathan Bush, Essay, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International
Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1094, 1102-03 (2009).

182. Id. at 1151-52, 1198.
183. Id. at 1198-99.
184. Id. at 1101.
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crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. From the outset, the jurisdiction of these tribunals was limited to individuals.' 85 Although it
was not crystal clear that such jurisdiction excluded legal persons such
as corporations or non-governmental organizations, no legal person was
ever charged in either of the tribunals.
This practice of limiting jurisdiction to natural persons was confirmed in Article 25(1) of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court: "The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute." 186 This decision was not without
controversy. One of the most important founding states, France, had initially proposed extending jurisdiction to legal as well as natural persons,
but
the proposal was rejected for several reasons which as a whole
are quite convincing. The inclusion of collective liability would
detract from the Court's jurisdictional focus, which is on individuals. Furthermore, the Court would be confronted with serious and ultimately overwhelming problems of evidence. In addition, there are not yet universally recognized common standards
for corporate liability; in fact, the concept is not even recognized
in some major criminallaw systems.18 7

The Rome Statute negotiations revealed some of the fundamental legal and practical difficulties of extending liability to corporate entities.
For instance, during the negotiations, several parties raised concerns
about the proper procedures for indicting a corporation and how evidence would be obtained from such an entity.188 Most importantly, the
negotiators debated and disagreed upon the method for determining the
mens rea of a legal person.'8 9 Facing time constraints on negotiations as
well as an enormous number of other issues, the Rome Statute parties
decided to focus on areas of consensus and uniformity.1 90
Although the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),
and the ICC deal with criminal liability, they are crucial to the estab185. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Counsel Resolution 808 (1993), art. 7(1), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993); S.C. Res.
955, art. 6(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
186. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
187. Kai Ambos, Individual Criminal Responsibility, Article 25 Rome Statute, in COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVER'S NOTES,
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 743, T 4 (Otto Trifferer ed., 2d ed. Supp. 2008) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Id.
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lishment of norms for civil liability in most of the ATS cases. Indeed,
the precedents for a variety of important principles of customary international law applied by courts in ATS cases are drawn from international criminal law because no other country or international tribunal permits the imposition of civil liability for what many countries deem
uniquely criminal violations.'91
Arguing that civil liability standards can or should be different is certainly defensible, but such arguments cannot then rely on widespread
international consensus. Courts in ATS cases already draw on these tribunals for evidence of an international consensus on principles of direct
private-actor liability as well as for aiding-and-abetting liability. But
such courts must take the bitter with the sweet, and the lack of any support for imposing liability on corporations from the modern international criminal tribunals is a serious blow for those claiming that corporate
liability under customary international law has broad international support.
2.

Treaties Imposing Duties on Business Entities

Defenders of corporate liability also point to a number of treaties that
have imposed duties on business entities. Professor Jordan Paust has
even suggested that this practice of regulating corporate behavior can be
extended through any reference to private-party conduct. 192 While there
is no evidence of international law extending to private corporations,
there is also no evidence that international law uniquely immunizes corporations from international law obligations.' 93 Hence, Professor Paust
would support the opposite rule: Unless an international norm specifically exempts corporations from liability, corporate liability should be
assumed. 194
This analysis ignores the central difference between direct and indirect liability under international law. Almost every treaty regime imposes liability indirectly by formally imposing an obligation on state parties
to impose duties on private parties. Treaties cannot impose duties on
private parties directly because private parties are not competent to
make treaties under international law.
For example, the OECD Convention Against Bribery of Foreign
Government Officials in International Business Transactions, 195 a treaty
191. See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1180 (C.D. Cal.
2005); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
192. See Paust,supra note 2, at 810.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 112 Stat. 3302, 37 I.L.M. 1.

2011]

CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS

385

almost wholly focused on regulating the behavior of private businesses,
imposes duties on its member states rather than such businesses.196 Of
course, those states must then transpose those duties onto persons. But
even here, the OECD Convention provides member states with flexibility. Article 2 of the Convention requires each member state to "take
such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign
public official."19 7 But as the official commentary makes clear, member
states may be excused from making this liability of corporate entities
criminal because many member states do not permit criminal punishment of corporations. 198 Allowing states to flexibly implement the
broader obligation reflects the traditional deference of international law
to the primacy of domestic legal mechanisms. Moreover, the "indirect"
framework comports with the conception of traditional international law
that duties should flow between states rather than directly onto individuals.
Even the flexible OECD Convention has run into complications and
confusing issues with respect to punishing legal persons. As a 2008
Working Group paper reports, some countries have limited the liability
of the legal person to situations where a senior official of the legal person committed the illegal act or where a natural person associated with
the legal person has already been convicted.' 99 This does not comport
with the practice of other member states and possibly undermines the
effectiveness of the treaty itself. The larger lesson from the OECD Convention is that there is a continuing lack of international consensus on
how and when to impose liability on corporations.
This lack of consensus is not limited to treaties like the OECD, which
are plainly concerned with business conduct. Treaties codifying the jus
cogens norms most frequently invoked in ATS cases (especially after
Sosa) reveal a similar lack of clarity and consensus. Neither the Torture
Convention nor the Genocide Convention mentions legal persons, although the Genocide Convention expressly contemplates state liability
as well as natural-person liability. 200 In the United States, courts have
196. Id. art. 2.
197. Id.
198. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], Commentaries on the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in Int'l Bus. Transactions, OECD Doc.

DAFFE/IME/BR(97)17/FINAL (Nov. 27, 1997).
199. Working Grp. on Bribery in Int'l Bus. Transactions, Consultation Paper: Review of the
OECD Instruments on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions Ten Years After Adoption, t 26 (Jan. 2008), http://tinyurl.com/2utk5kb.
200. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10 1984, S. TREATY DOc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 4, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
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generally interpreted laws implementing those conventions as proscribing conduct by natural persons only. 20 1
A Special Representative of the Secretary-General also recognized
the difficulty in resolving these conflicts in international opinion in a
2007 Human Rights Council report. 202 Noting that corporate liability is
essentially non-existent at the international tribunal level, the Special
Representative further conceded that any such liability would be the result of "indirect" duties imposed in the first instance on member
states.203 The variation in domestic laws governing the organization and
structure of such organizations imposed a further obstacle to uniform
and direct imposition of corporate duties. 204
In any event, the survey of treaty practice offers little support for the
imposition of liability directly on corporations. In general, such treaties
have always been careful to impose liability indirectly. The purpose of
such indirect liability has been in part to permit states to adjust the international norms to the variations of their domestic law relating to legal
persons. Such domestic complications probably explain the complete
lack of international precedent stemming from customary, as opposed to
treaty, law imposing liability on corporations. When one considers the
wide variety of international norms, the idea that all such norms should
be understood to extend to both natural and legal persons seems fanciful.
Moreover, the fact that many treaty-makers feel a need to specifically
extend a treaty's obligations to the regulation of legal persons belies the
claim that any reference to private-party duties under international law
should be assumed to apply to legal persons except when stated otherwise. If it is understood that references to individuals or private parties
in treaties automatically includes legal persons, then why do so many
treaties make it clear that they are extending to cover legal as well as
natural persons?

Finally, the direct versus indirect distinction draws into clarity what
the ATS cases are seeking to do. Rather than impose obligations on
201. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (noting that "[a]bsent some
congressional indication to the contrary, [courts] decline to give the same term in the same Act a
different meaning depending on whether the rights of the plaintiff or the defendant are at issue");
see also Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 381-82 (E.D. La. 1997) ("[T]he
plain meaning of the term 'individual' does not ordinarily include a corporation."), aff'd, 197
F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
202. Special Representatative of the Sec'y-Gen. on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corp. and Other Bus. Enters., Report, 4th Sess., Feb. 9, 2007, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb.
19, 2007).
203. See id. ? 35 (explaining that traditional international law only imposed duties indirectly
through states).
204. See id. 28 (noting difference in systems of attributing corporate liability under domestic
law).
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states, a theory of direct liability on non-state actors imposes obligations
regardless of whether that private person is acting on behalf of a state.
Even a theory of complicity with state action suggests that the non-state
actor owes international duties irrespective of its status as a representative or agent of a state. The starkness of this departure from traditional
conceptions of international law explains why the Nuremberg tribunals
are deemed foundational and revolutionary. It also may explain why
courts have only been willing to extend liability beyond states for those
most serious and widely accepted jus cogens norms.
D.

The Problem ofAttribution

Although he acknowledged the lack of international support for corporate liability under customary international law, Judge Weinstein
could not bring himself to dismiss the Agent Orange lawsuit on this
theory. 205 Put simply, even if there was a dearth of international precedent, he argued that "[1]imiting civil liability to individuals while exonerating the corporation . . . makes little sense in today's world." 2 0 6
Adopting the language of an amicus brief, he goes on to argue that
"[d]efendants present no policy reason why corporations should be
uniquely exempt from tort liability under the ATS, and no court has presented one either." 207 Judge Leval echoes this complaint in his forceful
Kiobel concurrence: "My colleagues do not even suggest any purpose or
goal the nations of the world might hope to derive from such a rule
[against corporate liability], and I can think of none."208
But there is an obvious policy reason for treating corporate and natural persons differently when it comes to ATS liability. Unlike those imposing liability on a natural person, courts imposing liabilities on corporations must also determine how and when to attribute the acts of a
corporate agent or actor to the corporate entity. This problem is particularly acute with respect to the importation of criminal-law norms that
require a showing of specific intent. As we have seen in the context of
the OECD Convention, there is little international consensus on what
the appropriate rule of attribution should be in the context of bribery.2 09
An initial draft of the Rome Statute that included jurisdiction over juridical entities, including private corporations, illustrates the range of
possible attribution theories.2 10 Under the draft, a finding of liability
205. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
206. Id.
207. Id at 59.

208. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL 3611392, at
*34 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010) (Leval, J., concurring).
209. See supra notes 195-199 and accompanying text.
210. See Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law
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against a legal person is conditioned on a simultaneous criminal conviction of a natural person who "was in a position of control" of the juridi-

cal entity and who was acting on behalf of and with the explicit consent
of the juridical person. 2 1 1 These requirements are far more onerous than
U.S. practice with respect to corporate criminal liability (much less corporate civil liability), where the intent and action of an agent within the
scope of his or her authority can establish liability for the whole corporation. 212 Moreover, there are various possibilities between these two
extremes.
The problem of attribution for private corporations has further variations. In one recent ATS case, plaintiffs sought to hold the parent com213
panies liable on a theory of alter ego and agency. As the district court
openly acknowledged, the utter lack of customary international law
standards for "piercing the corporate veil" required the district court to
rely instead on federal common law. 214 Even on questions of vicarious
liability, which the court suggested was well established under customary international law, it fell back on U.S. domestic law principles because "the international law of agency has not developed precise standards to apply in the civil context." 215
Stephen Ratner is the only scholar to have seriously wrestled with the
problem of attribution in the corporate context. Recognizing that neither
state rules of responsibility nor the limited individual rules of responsibility fit precisely, he has attempted to derive a distinct set of attribution
principles for corporations. 2 16 While interesting and plausible, he does
not claim that such principles in any way reflect existing international
practice.
Ratner's useful effort, however, does point to the benefits of treatymaking over deriving such rules through court "development" of customary international law. 217 In a treaty context, parties can specify such
rules or even specify that such rules are left to the domestic laws of state
parties. This is the approach taken by the OECD Convention. But, in the
over Legal Persons: Lessons Learnedfrom the Rome Conference on an International Criminal
Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra

note 2, at 139, 150-51 (discussing U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int'l Criminal Court, Working Grp. on Gen. Principles of Criminal Law, Working
Paper on Article 23, paras. 5, 6, U.N. Doc A/Conf.183/C.V/WGGP/L.5/Rev.2 (Jul. 3, 1998)).
211. Id. at 151.
212. See, e.g., United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a corporation may be held criminally liable for agents acting within the scope of
their employment).
213. See In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
214. Id. at 270-71.

215. Id. at 271.
216. See Ratner,supra note 2, at 450.
217. Id. at 538-39.
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ATS context, courts are left to derive such rules without guidance from
international sources. Such rules will be applied to both domestic and
foreign corporations regardless of the laws of the states of their incorporation. Corporations of diverse national origins, attempting in good faith
to avoid liability, will be faced with an extended period of judicial experimentation and uncertainty.
There is little or no support from international practice for the imposition of customary international law duties on corporate entities. Such
duties are rarely imposed on natural persons, and when instances of
such duties do occur, these norms are generally imposed through treatyimposed indirect duties on states. The only exception to this treaty process, arguably, is in the context of jus cogens violations. But even in
this context, as reflected in treaties codifying jus cogens norms and in
the practice of international criminal tribunals, there is almost no international support for the imposition of liability on corporations. The reason for this reluctance is not hard to understand. Corporate structures
differ from country to country, as do rules of attributing liability within
such structures or piercing through such structures to shareholders,
management, or parent corporations. No single rule of attribution has
been developed under customary international law or even in many treaty systems.
IV. EXPLAINING THE CURIOUS CONSENSUS ON CORPORATE
LIABILITY

There are persuasive and plausible arguments for why corporations
should be held liable for violations of customary international law. For
instance, Professor Ratner offers a sophisticated normative theory emacquired by multinational corpophasizing the uniquely important role
21
rations in the world community.218 The larger academic literature on
corporations and international law, including the discussion of corporate
social responsibility, is engaged in this important conversation as to
how to account for the unusual size and importance of modem transna-

tional corporations. 2

19

218. See id. at 523-24.
219. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Capital Punishment: Corporate Criminal Liability for
Gross Violations ofHuman Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 327, 332 (2001) (noting
that it is unremarkable in the United States for corporations to be held criminally liable); Simon
Chesterman, Oil and Water: Regulating the Behavior of Multinational Corporations Through
Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 307, 327 (2004) (discussing the conceptual difficulties of prosecuting corporations, acknowledging that it is an undeveloped area of international law); Surya
Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and InternationalLaw: Where
from Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 50 (2003) (discussing the concept of corporate legal personality under international law); Anita Ramasastry, CorporateComplicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon An Examination of ForcedLabor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational
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This complex discussion, however, is not the basis for the U.S. judicial consensus on corporate liability. Instead, the judicial consensus is
based on poor understandings of international law, especially the difference between treaty-based and customary international law. It is also
based on an unjustified reliance on U.S. decisions as a sign of an international consensus. The existence of this curious and misguided consensus prior to Kiobel reveals some important characteristics that U.S.
courts demonstrate when exercising their Sosa-granted common-law
powers over customary international law.
A.

Preferencefor U.S. Precedentsover InternationalPrecedents

First, the ATS corporate-liability saga reflects the almost overriding
importance of U.S. law over international law norms in federal court
decision-making. When entertaining ATS claims, U.S. courts will typically cite other U.S. court opinions for statements about the content of
international law before they will cite to international and foreign
sources. 220 While this may seem sensible, it also exposes courts to a
cascade of missed issues and errors that can compound over time because courts continue to cite only each other.
The rise of ATS corporate liability is a classic example of this phenomenon. Courts considered lawsuits against corporations as early as
1985 and exercised jurisdiction in cases involving corporations for almost two decades without seriously considering whether corporations
were amenable to such lawsuits. 22 1 One reason for this failure to spot
the issue was the consistent citation of courts to each other rather than to
international or foreign sources. Indeed, a surprisingly high number of
the key opinions in this area offer barely one or two citations to international and foreign sources in reaching their conclusions.2 22
To be sure, as I have argued in other work, there are structural reasons for courts to prefer citing U.S. courts over international and foreign
Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 152 (2002) (noting that corporations can commit in-

ternational crimes and can therefore be tried nationally); Elliot J. Schrage, Judging Corporate
Accountability in the Global Economy, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153, 173 (2003) (advocating

for the use of multilateral conventions to regulate corporations).
220. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 262-63 (2d Cir. 2008);
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 453 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
226 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 2000); Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996); Roe v.
Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 994-95 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2005); Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d
1250, 1260 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 24 (D.D.C 2000); Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303-04 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67
F. Supp. 2d 424, 441 (D.N.J. 1999).
221. See supra Part II.A.
222. See supra note 208.
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tribunals on questions of international law. 223 When courts cite foreign
and international sources of law, they run the risk of coming into conflict with the views of the political branches on those same sources of
law. These structural conflicts are unavoidable and courts might well try
to minimize such conflicts by citing mainly domestic sources.
Although this is a sensible approach, it is also in tension with the
ATS's mandate to ensure the application of only those norms of customary international law that are specific, universal, and obligatory. The
universality requirement is difficult to satisfy with a few or no citations
to international and foreign sources. It is even more difficult to do so
when courts misunderstand the conceptual distinction between treatybased and customary international law.
B.

The Temptation to Fill Gaps

The very nature of the ATS enterprise often leaves U.S. courts with
the task of resolving legal questions for which there are very few international precedents. This is not simply a question of assessing the universality of a particular norm. There are innumerable secondary and underlying issues that require courts to fashion answers with very little
guidance. Hence, courts attempting to derive standards for accomplice
liability have debated following a standard derived from the ICC Rome
Statute, a standard invoked by the ICTY, or standards supposedly invoked in the post-Nuremberg military tribunals.2 24
But the difficulty of determining international precedents has tempted
U.S. courts into gap-filling. Courts have argued that such questions
ought to remain a matter of federal common law, which is more legitimately and self-consciously shaped by the courts. 225 Some scholars have
also argued that international law itself provides authority to fill gaps
with municipal law through the concept of "general principles of
law." 226 The temptation to engage in gap-filling will always be very
strong because, despite claims to the contrary, very few of the norms
that ATS courts apply have been developed to the same level of detail
and complexity as most areas of domestic law.
Harmless but seemingly useful gap-filling has and will tempt U.S.
courts as they further develop the standards of private corporation liabil223. See generally Julian G. Ku, Structural Conflicts in the Interpretation of Customary International Law, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 857, 859-73 (2005) (discussing the structural con-

flicts for U.S. courts in citing to international law precedents).
224. See, e.g., Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 270 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
225. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
226. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33
U.N.T.S. 993.

392

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 51:353

ity under customary international law. Judicial pronouncements on veilpiercing for foreign corporations and their subsidiaries, enterprise liability, and standards for determining corporate intent will all be justified
and explained as gap-filling. As unincorporated associations enter the
conversation, one can imagine questions over determining the intent of
a limited liability partnership or its foreign law equivalent.
The temptation to fill gaps will be hard to resist in these contexts, but
gap-filling is fundamentally inconsistent with the overall Sosa framework. In that decision, both the majority and concurrence agreed that
federal courts should be prevented from creating new norms of international law.227 By filling gaps in key international law norms, courts engage in exactly the sort of discretionary norm creation that Sosa was
supposed to prevent.
C.

An Expansive Conception ofFederal Common Law

Others have also defended corporate liability by, curiously enough,
rejecting the applicability of customary international law to the issue.2 28
In this view, the question of whether a corporation can be held liable
under the ATS is a question of federal common law. Hence, even if customary international law fails to provide (as I have argued) a substantial
basis for imposing liability on corporations, federal courts may do so
because federal common law plainly does. This reasoning was endorsed
by at least two lower courts as an alternative basis for their finding that
corporate liability was appropriate under the ATS.229
On its face, the "just federal common law" defense to imposing corporate liability under the ATS seems the strongest and most persuasive
defense of this practice. Some version of this argument appears to have
been adopted by Judge Leval's concurrence in Kiobel.230 But this justi227. See supra text accompanying note 51.
228. In a recent article, Professor Ingrid Wuerth offers another version of this justification for
using federal common law. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and FederalCommon Law:
A New Approach, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). In her view, courts should look

to Congress' intent when determining whether to use domestic law principles versus international
law principles. Congress would have intended for the use of domestic law principles to determine
corporate liability due to the lack of applicability of international law precedents. But this analysis
really means that whenever international law precedents seem inapplicable, U.S. law can fill any
necessary gaps. This result seems at odds with the larger approach of Sosa, which is intended to
limit federal courts in this area ofjudicial lawmaking.
229. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 52, 59 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In
re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
230. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-480 0 -cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL 3611392, at
*28 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010) (Leval, J., concurring) ("The law of nations sets worldwide norms of
conduct, prohibiting certain universally condemned heinous acts. That body of law, however,
takes no position on whether its norms may be enforced by civil actions for compensatory damages.").
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fication is seriously in tension with the holding of the Sosa Court and
the constrained role that court envisioned for federal courts applying the
ATS.
The Sosa Court made it clear that the courts hearing ATS claims
must determine whether international law contains a universally accepted rule and defines that rule specifically and uncontroversially to include defendant's alleged conduct.23 1 It further noted that when considering whether to allow a claim to proceed, courts should also consider
"whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual."232 The Court cited two
prior lower court decisions that differed on whether a particular norm
extended liability to private non-state actors.233
Some defenders of corporate liability have suggested that this footnote only indicates that the question of state versus non-state actor liability is a question of international law, while the question of naturalperson versus legal-person liability is a matter left to domestic federal
common law.2 34 This parsing of the Court's language misses the larger
point. In the Court's view, the question of a norm extending to a particular type of actor is a question of international law, not domestic law.
This makes sense because in many international law contexts, the legal
identity of the parties is a necessary factor in determining what type of
international law, if any, is applicable to their conduct. For instance, if
an ATS claim was brought against an international organization, the
amenability of such an organization to ATS liability would almost certainly be a question of international law, not domestic U.S. law, because
of the identity of the actorfacing liability.235 A lawsuit seeking liability
against UN peacekeeping units for sexual abuse in the Congo 236 would
have to consider whether the United Nations is a subject of international
law capable of owing duties. It would be odd to simply assume that if
international law said nothing on this topic, a U.S. court would be authorized to determine under its own authority, and irrespective of the
views of Congress or the executive branch, that the United Nations
owed such duties.

231. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004).
232. Id. at 733 n.20.
233. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 237-39 (2d Cir. 1995); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
234. See Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392 at *36 (Leval, J., concurring).
235. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11).
236. See, e.g., Colurn Lynch, U.N Sexual Abuse Alleged in Congo, WASH. POST, Dec. 16,
2004, at A26.
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Indeed, the Second Circuit's famous holding in Kadic v. Karadzic
confirms the necessity of determining whether an ATS defendant is a
subject of international law.237 That seminal decision, which laid the analytical foundation for many corporate ATS lawsuits, offered a careful
analysis of whether a private party could owe duties under customary
international law.238 The Kadic court did not suggest that the lack of an
international norm prohibiting the imposition of liability would therefore authorize a state to impose such liability. Rather, it drew on numerous international sources to argue that such a norm imposing liability on
private actors exists. 239 It is hard to understand why this same approach
should not apply when considering the liability of a corporate actor for
the violation of an international law norm.
CONCLUSION

At the conclusion of his sarcastic and stinging concurrence in Sosa,
Justice Scalia offered a sharp recapitulation of the separation-of-powers
critique of the ATS. He described federal court ATS jurisprudence as
"usurping" the democratic lawmaking process "by converting what they
regard as norms of international law into American law." 240 He then
predicted that in this "illegitimate lawmaking endeavor, the lower courts
will be the principal actors . . . [a]nd no one thinks all of them are emi-

nently reasonable."2 4'
Justice Scalia's vision of federal courts engaged in unreasonable
lawmaking seems, at first glance, overly pessimistic. And the performance of U.S. courts in evaluating and developing the question of corporate liability for customary international law does not, at first glance,
seem unreasonable.
But if the Sosa majority believed that it was truly creating a set of
standards that would constrain and limit federal court activity to the
recognition of uncontroversial norms, it too was mistaken. The judicial
consensus in favor of corporate liability for customary international law
violations was built upon the thinnest of international jurisprudential
foundations. For over two decades, federal courts unconsciously and
uncontroversially settled on a rule imposing corporate liability with almost no discussion or analysis and resting on a very weak foundation.

237. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
238. Id at 239 ("[W]e hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether
undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals.").
239. See id. at 239-41.
240. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 750-51.
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The Second Circuit's recent decision in Kiobel offers a useful corrective to this otherwise poor judicial record. Yet the divide between the
majority and concurrence in this decision reveals that many federal
judges still maintain a broad conception of federal judicial discretion
under the ATS. Departing from earlier claims in Talisman that there was
a broad universal consensus in favor of corporate liability, the concurring opinion in Kiobel offers a new rationale that is likely to be embraced by other circuits and by plaintiffs in a future appeal to the Supreme Court.
Under this new argument, federal courts should have the independent
authority to fashion civil remedies against any type of private actor as
long as there is no strong international precedent prohibitingsuch remedies. Even though this position appears to be based on a federal common law theory, such an approach to corporate liability is the exact opposite conception of the limited and constrained judicial role envisioned
by the Sosa court.
Overall, neither the rise of a consensus in favor of corporate liability
nor its latest defense reflects well on the federal courts' exercise of discretion under the ATS. For over two decades, courts either resolved the
issue with barely any analysis, as in the Eleventh Circuit, or they rested
their reasoning on flawed and unconvincing analysis of international
sources. In recent cases, some courts and academic supporters will now
argue for a broad federal common law discretion unchained even from
international law limitations. Overall, the story of how corporations
came to be defendants in ATS lawsuits vindicates much of Justice Scalia's skepticism. It offers a cautionary lesson about the performance of
federal courts under the ATS, should the Supreme Court choose to revisit the Alien Tort Statute in future years.
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